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abstract
This paper represents an exploratory study that examines political contingency in a less 
liberal regulatory regime such as the ‘positive state’ or the ‘developmental state’. As an 
example of a state-led policy, the implementation of a workforce localization policy is 
examined through an intensive case study on the oil- and gas-based industries (OGBI), the 
most significant economic sector in Qatar. In particular, the paper identifies the strategies 
and mechanisms that the government utilizes in its efforts to gain commitment from public 
enterprises to replace its expatriate workforce with nationals. The empirical analysis focuses 
on two main themes: state influence on public organizations and the HR practices that are 
used to enhance workforce localization. The findings reveal that the government has adopted 
some innovative control strategies that are not widely acknowledged within the literature. 
These include its continuous re-shuffling and replacement of decision-makers and key 
personnel in state enterprises. Moreover, the government dominates by playing an active 
role in forming OGBI strategies through appointing the Minister of Energy to the highest 
hierarchical positions such as chairman and managing director in the industries. However, 
state enterprises’ reactions to the state-led localization policy vary considerably. The study 
provides new evidence that public organizations do not always comply with politically-
determined policies. The evaluation of the implementation of localization strategy shows 
that there are three approaches toward what may be called ‘Qatarization’, namely, strategic 
adaptation; pragmatic acceptance, and implicit avoidance. The approaches are strongly 
associated with understanding the policy aims and linking the policy to HR practices.
Keywords: political contingency; workforce localization; developmental state; Qatarization.
 i. introduction
It is widely acknowledged that Human Re-
source Management (HRM) policies and 
practices are influenced by the state (Scott 
2000). The political contingency, which 
is represented in ministerial intervention, 
formal roles, and state-led policies and 
targets, influences the formulation and the 
implementation of strategies in public enter-
prises more significantly than private busi-
nesses (Batstone et al. 1984). Although the 
role of the state and its influences on HRM 
has been thoroughly investigated since the 
1980s, especially in the UK whereby stud-
ies, including Batstone et al. (1984); Ferner 
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(1985); Ferner and Colling (1991); and Mar-
tinez Lucio et al. (1997) have shed light on 
the dynamics of state policy, regulation, and 
activity in relation to the development and 
implementation of business strategies and 
HRM practices at an organisational level, 
it can be argued that it is still under-theo-
rized in specific areas. One of these under-
explored environments is the ‘developmen-
tal state’ (Ashton et al. 1999; 2000; Ashton 
2004) or the ‘positive state’ (Majone 1994; 
1995). In these types of regulatory regimes, 
the state exercises significant influence on 
the public sector through direct intervention 
in the economy and the labour market. It 
can be assumed, therefore, that the way the 
state pursues change is not unified across the 
world, since the role of the state in the econ-
omy varies according to the adopted regu-
latory system. For example, in more liberal 
economies, the government usually influ-
ences the market indirectly through legisla-
tion and regulation, while in less developed 
economies state intervention is usually by 
more direct means such as public ownership 
(Majone 1994).
The importance of the current study, there-
fore, arises from the gap in the knowledge 
regarding political contingency in the less 
liberal regulatory regimes. Although, as ar-
gued above, the role of the state in the labor 
market varies according to the regulatory 
regime, more scientific examinations have 
focused on the transformation from a less 
to a more liberal regulatory system, such as 
the shift that occurred in the late 1970s in 
Europe from the so-called ‘positive state’ to 
the ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1994). Most 
of the studies in the following period inves-
tigated the role of networks and agencies in 
forming and supporting regulation. While 
the regulatory systems in many countries, 
especially in the developing world, have not 
yet matured and the state plays a dominant 
role in their economic and social lives, less 
effort has been made to examine the nature 
of government intervention in these societ-
ies. Specifically,  countries that can be de-
scribed as ‘positive states’ have received 
less attention in the literature than those 
countries with more advanced regulatory 
systems. Therefore, investigating the role of 
the state in one of the ‘developmental states’ 
or ‘positive states’ would contribute to the 
existing knowledge by expanding current 
understanding of the mechanics of policy 
change in these regimes.
This research focuses on the case of Qatar, 
which is one of the countries that required 
the public sector to implement a politically-
determined localization strategy. As a valid 
example of a less liberal regulatory regime, 
Qatar is best described as a ‘positive state’, 
since the state owns most of the productive 
and important sectors of the country and the 
government plays a dominant role in creat-
ing employment. The country is rich in oil 
and gas and is undergoing a massive state-
formation process. This process requires the 
full utilization of natural as well as human 
resources. As a human resource utilization 
strategy, the Qatari government has intro-
duced and maintained a workforce localiza-
tion strategy. This study, therefore, seeks to 
provide an in-depth understanding of the 
government’s influence on the implementa-
tion of a state-led policy, such as the work-
force localization strategy, in a less liberal 
regulatory regime, such as Qatar. That will 
be achieved by investigating six government 
and semi-government organizations from oil 
and gas based industries (OGBI) in Qatar.
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Localizing the workforce is a long stand-
ing international issue (Rees et al. 2007). 
It is defined by scholars as the process of 
developing job-related skills within the lo-
cal population with the final objective of 
replacing expatriates with local employees 
(Wong and Law 1999; Worm et al. 2001; 
Law et al. 2004). In Qatar, localization, 
which is referred to locally as ‘Qatarization’ 
is defined as “the identification and devel-
opment of quality, competent Qatari males 
and females to assume permanent positions” 
(Al-Horr 2010: 124). An adjective was later 
added to the term. Localization policies are 
now called ‘quality Qatarization’ which 
means recruiting and developing Qataris to 
a standard comparable with their counter-
parts around the world (Qatarization 2010). 
Despite it is severely underrepresented in 
scholarly literature (Forstenlechner 2010a), 
localization is an interesting policy to study 
because it is usually perceived as an HR 
policy. It differs from the state-led policies 
in the UK, i.e. privatisation, modernisation 
and commercialization, since the imple-
mentation of policies usually influences 
most aspects of a firm’s operations such as 
production, finance, marketing and HRM, 
while the responsibility for implementing 
the localization policy is usually delegated 
to the HRM departments. This character-
istic, therefore, makes it an appealing case 
for a study that focuses on the influence of 
political contingency on HRM policies and 
practices in the public sector. 
ii. literature reVieW
The core argument of this research is that 
public corporations are performing eco-
nomic functions within a politically-deter-
mined environment which influences the 
strategy formation process, target-setting, 
and managerial practices in these organiza-
tions. Many commentators such as Batstone 
et al. (1984), Ferner and Colling (1991), and 
Pendleton (1997) argue that the most crucial 
feature distinguishing public sector firms 
from private firms is the political contingen-
cy that determines the relationship between 
the government and the public corporations. 
Therefore, it is widely acknowledged in the 
public administration literature that public 
corporations usually pursue politically-led 
objectives, that  might not always be based 
on the needs of the economic system (Elias-
sen 1993). Chapman (1999) adds that the 
managerial concentration on managing the 
political dimension in some cases exceeds 
the focus on the needs of the organization’s 
primary clients. The services these public 
corporations provide, therefore, are pre-
sented not just as being in the interests of 
business, but in the interests of the nation 
or of the public (Fogarty and Brooks 1989; 
Jessop 1994). In other words, the service 
provided can be labelled as a ‘public ser-
vice’ (Batstone et al. 1984: 275).
Historically, one of the key consequences 
of this political contingency is the ‘arm-
twisting’ relationship between the govern-
ment and public enterprises. For example, 
although profitability was one of the core 
elements of the commercial paradigm 
that  the public firms were obliged to work 
within, the government frequently overrode 
the commercially-oriented plans of man-
agement, especially when it involved cuts 
in the service, in order to achieve national 
objectives such as reducing unemployment 
(Ferner 1985, 1988). A number of policy in-
struments were used to maintain this ‘arm-
twisting’ relationship, but the most common 
method was financial control. The aim of the 
financial restrictions was to encourage pub-
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lic enterprises to improve the quality of their 
products and services, while maintaining or 
reducing the financial resources needed to 
provide the service (Pollitt 1993).
Moreover, as a result of the pursuit of mac-
roeconomic goals such as commercializa-
tion and modernization, management strate-
gies and the corresponding HR policies and 
practices were influenced by these goals. It 
is argued that government intervention in 
public enterprises has led to a shift in mana-
gerial practices toward emphasizing value 
for money and high-quality outputs instead 
of the standardized ‘model employer’ prac-
tices in the public sector whereby the welfare 
needs of the workforce are placed at the top 
of the priority list. In addition, a number of 
public enterprises undertook radical restruc-
turing of the managerial hierarchy, usually 
involving derailing the organisational struc-
ture. Other HR practices such as overtime, 
redundancy, and pay determination were 
all influenced by government intervention. 
For example, overtime was substantially 
reduced; early retirement and redundancy 
were encouraged; and performance-related 
pay was introduced (Pendleton 1997; Os-
wick and Grant 1996).
The workforce localization strategy, which 
is a common policy in many parts of the 
world such as China, Singapore, Malaysia, 
and the Middle East, is a typical example of 
a state-led policy that illustrates the political 
contingency associated with the role of the 
state in implementing a macro strategy in 
public enterprises and its implications on the 
HR practices in these firms. Forstenlechner 
(2010b) asserts that most practitioners and 
academics believe that localization is not 
actually advantageous for organizations op-
erating in the region. The only tangible ben-
efits for organizations adopting localization 
“is the gain of legitimacy and goodwill with 
legitimizing actors such as respective gov-
ernments and the ruling class” (Forstenlech-
ner 2010b: 240). localization is even been 
sometimes described as a numbers game for 
the sake of PR (Forstenlechner 2008). Al-
Waqfi and Forstenlechner (2010) add that 
increasing citizens’ workforce participation 
in GCC countries represent an increasingly 
urgent challenge to respective governments 
as well as local and multinational organiza-
tions.
It is notable that, despite all the contextual 
differences between the UK and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, for 
instance, they share the fact that the gov-
ernment has intervened in the public sector 
to achieve macro-policy targets. However, 
the nature and the extent of the intervention 
vary. While the UK government introduced 
extensive legislation prescribing goals and 
methods, financial incentives and restric-
tions, and an ‘arm-twisting’ relationship 
through which public services are to be pro-
vided (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005), the main in-
struments used by the GCC authorities were 
both quantitative and qualitative in nature. 
The former included setting employment 
targets and quotas and increasing the costs 
of using foreign labour. The latter typically 
involved investing in improving the skill 
formation process for nationals.
It is essential to note that, in this review 
of political contingency in the public sec-
tor, considerable emphasis has been placed 
on the analyses carried out in the UK. The 
reason for studying the UK public sector is 
because Britain has been in the vanguard of 
the public services reform movement; there-
fore, it seemed logical to study the change 
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process in this country to determine what 
lessons can be learned by other countries 
contemplating similar future reforms (Mor-
gan and Allington 2003; Flynn 2000; Hood 
1995). To summarise, the example from the 
UK of the influence of state-led policies 
on HRM policies and practices shows that 
HRM in the public sector has been widely 
affected by government intervention, and as 
a result, the role and the traditional features 
of HRM in the public sector have been re-
placed by new managerial practices. Analyt-
ical examination of the UK-based literature 
would help to develop a theoretical frame-
work to work with when studying another 
context, provided that the similarities and 
differences between the two contexts are ac-
knowledged.
iii. research aPProach 
       and Justification
Since this is an exploratory study that  ex-
amines the political pressures on public or-
ganizations in Qatar to pursue state-led tar-
gets, the use of an inductive method in the 
form of an intensive qualitative case study 
inquiry is necessarily dominant. The main 
reason for this is that the research explores 
an under-developed area of the literature 
concerning the relationship between the gov-
ernment and public enterprises in Qatar and 
the effect of this relationship on the HRM 
function in these organizations; thus, more 
detailed data such as policymakers’ as well 
as public employees’ perceptions and expe-
riences uncovers more unexplored tension. 
This tension could be a result of compet-
ing government and organizational targets. 
For example, implementing a workforce 
localization strategy in Qatar (Qatarization) 
would eventually increase employment 
costs, especially those associated with em-
ployees’ training and development, which 
contradicts the cost-efficiency target that 
profit-oriented organizations try to achieve. 
Therefore, an intensive qualitative approach 
has been chosen to gather comprehensive 
data from all stakeholders that are involved 
in the Qatarization process: government of-
ficials, education policymakers, public orga-
nizations’ management, and staff.
In order to achieve the research aim of in-
vestigating the government’s efforts to 
use public organizations as instruments to 
achieve national targets, the research uses 
a multi-level case study approach. The first 
is the research undertaken in Qatar, one of 
the countries that has been implementing a 
localization strategy since the 1980s, yet has 
had very little attention in the mainstream lit-
erature on workforce localization. The case 
study on the sectoral level is in the OGBI. 
This sector is chosen for its methodological 
qualities: firstly, this sector is at the heart of 
the economy of Qatar since its revenue ac-
counts for over 70 per cent of the national 
income; secondly, the sector leads other sec-
tors in implementing the Qatarization policy. 
The OGBI were the first to initiate Qatariza-
tion plans in the early 1980s, and the sector 
was the first to introduce a sectoral Qatar-
ization strategy rather than leaving it to the 
individual organizations, and, finally, the 
sector is composed entirely of public corpo-
rations, and therefore, the influence of the 
government on them is expected to be high, 
which makes them an appropriate choice 
for the current study. The third level of the 
case study approach examines six govern-
ment and semi-government enterprises. 
The examination includes Qatar Petroleum 
(QP), which is the largest firm in the OGBI 
and it represents government ownership of 
all the companies operating in the sector. In 
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and the companies’ documentation to check 
their compatibility.
iV. findings and 
      discussion
Based on the identified gap in the existing 
public management literature regarding 
political contingency in positive or devel-
opmental states, the main objective of this 
research was to understand the mechanics 
of policy change in less liberal regulatory 
regimes such as developmental or positive 
states.
Investigating Qatar as a case study extended 
the understanding of the complexity of the 
role of the state in the labour market. One of 
the key findings of the current study is the 
fact that Qatar shares some of the features 
described in the public administration lit-
erature, but the case study also illustrates a 
distinctive situation of complex networking 
and dual roles of key political actors. In this 
regard, the current case study confirms that, 
despite all the contextual differences be-
tween the regulatory state, which facilitates 
its intervention through indirect means such 
as regulation, and the positive state, which 
usually exercises direct intervention such as 
public ownership, a feature common to both 
is that the government has intervened in the 
public sector to achieve macro-policy tar-
gets. However, the nature and the extent of 
the interventions vary. The examination of 
the Qatari case has provided new evidence 
of the role of complex networks, the exer-
cise of an ‘arm-twisting’ relationship, and 
the importance of target setting and of the 
monitoring process. It has illustrated how 
these tensions are dealt with differently in 
other countries.
addition, five QP subsidiaries are also in-
vestigated. For the purpose of maintaining 
participant anonymity, the names of the five 
cases are replaced by aliases, namely: Com-
pany A; Company B; Company C; Compa-
ny D, and, Company E. Table 1 includes the 
number of participants in each employment 
level; Table 2 shows the distribution of the 
interviewees among the participating com-
panies and employment levels; and Table 3 
reports the distinctive characteristics of each 
case study.
A case study approach is useful for explor-
ing the motives that encourage the govern-
ment and organizations to implement a Qa-
tarization scheme; moreover, the barriers 
standing on the way can best be explored 
through case studies. Furthermore, detailed 
case studies can answer the question of 
whether tensions are raised within the or-
ganization or between the organization and 
the government as a result of implementing 
the localisation scheme. In order to obtain 
these detailed responses, semi-structured in-
terviews that are used to allow respondents 
the freedom to express their views, opinions 
and perceptions, which is the essential mo-
tive for adopting a qualitative approach. The 
themes that are covered in the interviews are 
developed from the major findings of the rel-
evant literature. In addition to the interviews, 
a wide range of related secondary data such 
as government statistics and organisations’ 
documentation is also used, since this is very 
useful for historical statistical analysis and 
for identifying progress. The other rationale 
for using secondary data is for triangulation 
purposes. The responses provided by the 
interviewees, especially those related to the 
progress of the Qatarization process and the 
current status of the implementation, were 
compared with official government statistics 
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Table 1
The number of participants in each employment level.
Position number areas to be explored with the interviewees
Macro-Level Policy 
Makers
3 The political contingency and the state influence on 
public enterprise strategies.
 Educational
Policymakers
4 The political contingency in coordinating the 
education institutes (public sector) and the OGBI 
(public enterprises)
 Public/semi-government
Top Management
9 The political contingency and the state influence 
on public enterprise strategies and how these are 
reflected in the HRM function.
 Operational/Line
Management
6 The tensions that are raised and the HRM practices 
which are implemented in response to the state-led 
localisation strategy.
Staff/Senior Staff 12 The tensions that are raised and the HRM practices 
which are implemented in response to the state-led 
localisation strategy.
total 34
Table 2
The distribution of the interviewees among the participating companies and employment levels.
 top
management
 operational/line
management
staff/senior staff total
QP 3 1 1 5
company a 1 2 3 6
company b 1 1 1 3
company c 1 1 2 4
company d 2 1 3 6
company e 1 1 1 3
total 9 7 11 27
Table 3
The distinctive characteristics of each case study.
company type company age
upstream downstream
long-
established
)over 15 years(
medium
 from 5 to(
)15 years
newly-
established
)under 5 years(
QP P P
company a P P
company b P P
company c P P
company d P P
company e P P
Vol. 16
No. 1
Vol. 16
No. 1
46
The evaluation of the implementation of the 
workforce localization policy in the OGBI 
in Qatar showed that political contingency is 
present in pursuing such a policy in the sec-
tor. It confirms that the state used its own-
ership of the public corporations to oblige 
them to accept the Qatarization policy. A 
key person clearly stated that ‘QP is not 
encouraging its subsidiaries! It is forcing 
them to participate. In other words, QP has 
become the custodian of the Qatarization 
policy in OGBI’ (Central Training Manager, 
QP). The nature of the policy was consid-
ered to be macro-economic, since participat-
ing companies could not expect to experi-
ence any direct benefit from the policy in 
their performance; instead, the policy aimed 
to benefit the Qatari economy in terms of 
reducing unemployment and capturing for-
eign remittances. Responses such as ‘When 
you employ Qataris, you do not only help 
the company, but you are helping the coun-
try as well ... It is reasonable to aim for na-
tionals to be in charge of the industry’ (Head 
of Training, Company D) or comments such 
as, ‘At the end, we are protecting national 
interests, looking after the well being and 
business continuity for the state of Qatar’ 
(HR Manager, Company D) are very com-
mon among participants. This confirms the 
views explored in the literature review that 
public managers differ from those of private 
firms in terms of pursuing politically-deter-
mined strategies and targets (Batstone et al. 
1984; Ferner 1985).
Similar to the historic circumstances in the 
UK (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005), the interven-
tion of the Qatari authorities has expanded 
to cover target-setting and to impose a 
monitoring process. Unlike the situation in 
the UK, where the performance and profit 
targets were sometimes achievable, the Qa-
tari authorities have set a very high local-
ization target that even government officials 
believe to be unrealistic. This led a number 
of participants to argue that ‘Qatarization’ is 
only a ‘show’ or a ‘game’ and the govern-
ment is not serious about the pre-determined 
targets. This argument is supported by the 
inconsistency in defining the Qatarization 
targets, and the absence of any incentives 
or penalties for meeting or failing to meet 
the policy targets. It can also be argued that 
this vagueness in the Qatarization policy is 
intentional on the part of the authorities in 
order to allow the participating companies a 
room to manoeuvre. In other words, instead 
of confronting the companies with a persis-
tent and politically-determined policy, the 
authorities obliged the companies to join a 
loose policy to which they are tightly bound. 
This is another key difference between the 
Qatari context, which has similarities to 
positive and developmental states, and the 
situation in the UK, which represents the 
regulatory state. The difference lies in the 
ambiguity of the aim of the policy in Qatar; 
in more advanced countries, the state-led 
policies were focused on achieving certain 
aims. In the UK, for example, the empha-
sis was on ‘achieving revolutionary change, 
dismantling existing structures and moving 
toward a minimalist or “night watchman 
state”’ (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005: 15).
The third distinctive feature of the political 
contingency in Qatar is that, unlike the com-
mon financial restrictions tool used by the 
different governments in the UK (Pendleton 
1997), the Qatari government influenced the 
strategy formation process in public enter-
prises through manipulating the manage-
ment of these organizations. This can be 
understood in the light of one of the views 
on operationalzing regulations, which con-
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siders it to be ‘all mechanisms of social con-
trol – including unintentional and non-state 
processes’ (Baldwin et al. 1998: 4). In other 
words, the state is influencing the market, 
not only through the regular command and 
control method, but also through networks 
and actors (Martinez Lucio and MacKenzie 
2004).
To place this in the Qatari context, the state 
maintains the implementation of the Qatar-
ization policy in public firms by appointing 
people ‘loyal’ to QP, who also have good ac-
cess to the political elites through their net-
works and social connections, to most key 
positions in the OGBI. This was apparent 
when the respondents from the top manage-
ment category clearly stated that whenever 
they needed to justify their situation they 
talked directly to the Minister of Energy, 
who is responsible for monitoring Qatariza-
tion in the OGBI. The use of networks in 
this and similar situations has benefited both 
parties, that is, the state and the manage-
ment teams of public corporations. On the 
one hand, it has helped the state to introduce 
targets and quota systems without any sig-
nificant resistance from public management. 
On the other hand, it has allowed public 
management the opportunity to contact the 
decision maker directly, and in some cases, 
influence him to relax some of the require-
ments or the consequences for non compli-
ance. For example, as illustrated earlier in 
this study , Company E was granted an ex-
emption for not include its unskilled labor 
in the overall Qatarisation percentages and 
quotas. In addition, there were no penalties 
for any of the companies that had never met 
the Qatarization targets. The networks were 
also useful in another case. During a meet-
ing, management in the OGBI reached an 
unofficial agreement to limit employee mo-
bility within the sector. As a result, poaching 
within the OGBI was significantly reduced.
The other instrument that the state applied 
to pursue its politically-determined policy in 
the OGBI is through the multiple functions 
of the head of the OGBI. Mr Al Attiyah, 
the Minister of Energy, dominated a num-
ber of crucial positions in the OGBI, such 
as chairman and general manager of cer-
tain companies, in addition to his position 
in the government. This situation, whereby 
the same person has a number of conflicting 
roles ranging from being a member of the 
government to managing semi-government 
companies, has provided Mr Al Attiyah with 
the means to coordinate these conflicting 
parties and steer them toward a unified state-
led policy, i.e. Qatarization, with minimum 
explicit resistance from the companies. 
However, these conflicting roles might lead 
employees to wonder where the strategies 
come from, as one participant comments:
The Minister of Energy is the 
Chairman of QP and the Chairman 
of [Company B], so it is difficult 
to distinguish between whether 
a policy is an intervention of QP 
and the Ministry of Energy or if it 
is coming from the company itself 
(HR Manager, Company B).
This is a key factor in the relationship be-
tween the state and the state-owned com-
panies. The above quotation illustrates the 
confusion that personnel in the energy in-
dustry feel as a result of the multiple roles 
of the Minister. Consequently, whenever 
conflicting interests arose, the interests of 
the state took precedence over the interests 
of the individual organizations. This can be 
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considered to be one of the elements leading 
to an ‘arm-twisting’ relationship between 
the state and state enterprises that Batstone 
et al. (1984) identified.
As a result of this relationship between the 
state and public corporations, the sorts of 
challenges arising from implementation of 
the state-led Qatarization policy differ from 
those associated with modernization and 
commercialization policies, which were 
politically driven in the UK. In the UK, 
the challenges were mainly over the strat-
egy formation process. The state offered 
incentives and applied financial restrictions 
to influence public firms’ strategies; on the 
other hand, public management engaged in 
a negotiation process with the government 
over company-related benefits. In Qatar, 
however, there is less evidence that this sort 
of challenge was involved. Instead, public 
management claim that they are committed 
to Qatarization and are willing to implement 
it whenever possible; however, they argue 
that it is difficult to achieve the policy targets 
due to a number of ‘external’ challenges that 
are out of the companies’ control. The par-
ticipants believed that broader labour market 
conditions such as skill shortages are a key 
factor in hindering the achievement of local-
ization goals. Despite the state’s continual 
search for appropriate rules of action to en-
hance Qatarization in the OGBI, the policy 
faces a number of challenges. The empirical 
examination has shown that there are two 
major external aspects that affect strategic 
planning and policy formulation regarding 
localizing the workforce at the macro-level: 
the growth and structure of the population 
and the educational system.
The population size has had a direct effect on 
the Qatarization policy, since the small size 
of the indigenous human capital has resulted 
in an extreme dependence on non-nationals. 
The low average age of the population, the 
high male/female ratio, and the low partici-
pation of Qatari nationals in the labor force, 
especially in the non-government sector, all 
seem to be correlated to the fact that there 
is only a small indigenous population and, 
therefore, a significant non-national popula-
tion. Therefore, it is clear that it would not 
be possible to implement a social and eco-
nomic development plan without foreign 
labor. Thus, reliance upon the non-national 
population seems unavoidable, at least at the 
current stage of development.
With regards to the educational system, it 
has a direct and negative influence on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of such a pro-
cess. The current system is blamed for not 
being able to provide the different sectors 
of the economy, particularly the OGBI, with 
a qualified national workforce in terms of 
an ‘adequate’ level of general or technical 
skills. As a result, the overall formulation of 
the Qatari human capital might not be well 
utilized in the country.
Surprisingly, one of the key demands of 
the interviewees, especially those from the 
OGBI, is more state intervention in the la-
bour market to correct the imbalances caus-
ing the aforementioned external challenges. 
Most participants believe that the state is 
able to coordinate the different government 
authorities, such as educational institutes, la-
bour authorities, and public sector employ-
ers, to match the educational outputs with 
the industry requirements and to reduce the 
competition to attract nationals among the 
various employers in the public domain. 
This contradicts with the general notion in 
the literature that public management seeks 
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greater control and less state intervention in 
their domain. One explanation for this situ-
ation could be the strong loyalty of public 
management, who are usually appointed by 
the state, to the state’s aims and vision.
In conclusion, the first contribution of the 
present research to the existing debate of 
political contingency in the public sector 
is to show that a less advanced regulatory 
regime, such as the one in Qatar, is proved 
to be similar in some aspects to what used 
to be the situation in more liberal regulatory 
systems, such as the UK, while differing 
from them in other aspects. It is similar in 
terms of using public ownership as a means 
to pursue macro-level policies, while it dif-
fers in how public ownership is utilized. It 
is argued for the key instrument that the Qa-
tari authorities employed is controlling the 
key administrative and executive positions 
in the OGBI by appointing loyal people to 
these posts and maintaining formal and in-
formal networks both among them and be-
tween them and the state.
The other contribution of the current study 
is extending the knowledge regarding HRM 
in general, and more specifically, how work-
force localization policies are implemented 
in different contexts and how this affects the 
HR function. As to the implications of the 
current study for the HRM field, the findings 
highlighted the importance of understanding 
how ‘external’ factors shape HRM decisions. 
Although the classic HRM models such 
as the ‘matching models’ (Fombrun et al. 
1984) and the ‘Harvard framework’ (Beer et 
al. 1984), and later input such as Pettigrew’s 
contribution have all recognized the role of 
the external environment in shaping a busi-
ness strategy, the main concern with these 
models has been their focus on the HRM 
levers and their consistency. In other words, 
less emphasis was placed on the role of the 
state in the labour market in the mainstream 
HR literature. Therefore, the current study 
makes a considerable contribution to linking 
the notion of political contingency to HRM 
policies and choices by arguing that HRM in 
Qatar is configured differently compared to 
elsewhere as a result of the state interference 
in the labour market.
The present study has also made a contribu-
tion to HRM literature on the implementa-
tion of localization policies. The study has 
revealed the limitations of the prescriptive 
literature for understanding the complexities 
of localization within specific labour mar-
ket and institutional contexts. When there 
is a supply shortage in the national labour 
market and when the available nationals are 
unqualified and unprepared actively to fill 
the positions held by expatriates, localiza-
tion processes may be destined to failure 
(Gamble 2000). The validity of the prescrip-
tive literature is also questionable; since 
that research was conducted in the MNCs 
in China, its generalization in other contexts 
might be limited. 
When it comes to the implementation of the 
Qatarization policy on the micro-level, the 
participating companies differ in their atti-
tudes to the policy. Three approaches can be 
recognised: strategic adaptation, pragmatic 
acceptance and implicit avoidance. A num-
ber of companies, namely QP, Company C, 
and Company D, have strategically adapted 
the Qatarization process to achieve the 50 
percent target. Both management and em-
ployees in these companies share a similar 
understanding of the policy aims and objec-
tives, focusing on the ‘Quality’ Qatariza-
tion. Moreover, a greater degree of com-
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mitment to the policy than that displayed 
by other companies could be found across 
the different organizational levels that were 
established through continuous communica-
tion and sufficient financial resources. Fur-
thermore, the plans and HR practices such 
as recruitment and training are continuously 
monitored and amended. With regards to re-
cruitment, these companies have not limited 
themselves to the traditional forms of at-
tracting national talents; instead, innovative 
methods were used to attract nationals. With 
respect to training, the establishment of in-
dividual training programmes and successor 
planning are common tools to achieve qual-
ity Qatarization. The way in which these 
companies engaged in Qatarization allowed 
them to achieve the highest Qatarization 
percentages among the participating com-
panies. This confirms the assumption that 
communicating the localization policy’s 
aims and objectives and then linking them 
to HR practices can lead to successful im-
plementation (Fryxell et al. 2004, Wong and 
Law 1999, Law et al. 2004, Warner 2004).
Two out of the six cases examined, namely, 
Company A and Company B, seemed to 
show less commitment to the policy. De-
spite their ‘official’ commitment to the Qa-
tarization policy, there is no communication 
between the different organizational levels 
regarding the policy, and only meagre fi-
nancial resources are allocated to attracting 
nationals to their workforce. Moreover, in-
sufficient communication resulted in a lack 
of awareness among the workforce in these 
companies of the nature and aims of the Qa-
tarization strategy. Conflicting definitions, 
some focusing on numbers, some focusing 
on training, were provided by the intervie-
wees in these cases. Once those conflicting 
definitions are resolved, the link between 
HR levers and the Qatarisation policy in 
these two companies could be identified. 
Both companies considered training a key 
activity to achieving Qatarization through 
developing nationals and qualifying them to 
replace expatriates. These companies, how-
ever, have employed only the traditional re-
cruitment method of advertising vacancies 
to attract nationals.
The third approach to Qatarization was 
implicit avoidance. Among the six visited 
cases, Company E is putting the least ef-
fort into achieving the Qatarization targets. 
The Qatarization policy in Company E is 
concerned only with increasing the number 
of nationals in the workforce rather than fo-
cusing on developing them. Therefore, they 
make no training facilities or training pro-
grammes available to nationals. As for the 
recruitment practices, the company avoids 
employing new national graduates, and at 
the same time, breaches the agreement with 
the OGBI and poaches qualified nationals 
from the sector. Moreover, the financial re-
sources allocated to attracting nationals and 
developing them are much lower than those 
in the remaining participating companies.
In conclusion, this second contribution of 
the current research to the existing HRM 
and localization literature is to emphasize 
the importance of considering the external 
environment when examining HRM poli-
cies and practices, since these can be config-
ured differently as a consequence of exter-
nal influences. In addition, the current study 
has demonstrated that the challenges and 
the implications of the workforce localiza-
tion policy also vary according to external 
influences. The three approaches are sum-
marized in Table 4.
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As mentioned earlier, the Qatari case was 
initially chosen to represent the ‘positive 
state’ which is one of the types of regulatory 
models that  Majone (1995) has described: 
the positive state and the regulatory state. A 
positive state also shares some of the fea-
tures of Ashton et al.’s (2000) model of the 
developmental state. For example, the Qa-
tari authorities have direct interference in 
the labour market, which is one of the fea-
tures of both the positive state and the devel-
opmental state. The Qatari authorities also 
have to facilitate their intervention through 
public ownership, which is another feature 
of the positive state. However, instead of us-
ing budgetary instruments such as borrow-
ing and spending, the Qatari government 
influences the public sector through rule 
making and legislation, both of which are 
characteristic of the regulatory state. This 
case, however and despite leaning more to-
ward the less liberal system of the positive 
state, proves that a rigid categorisation sys-
tem to identify the positive state and regula-
tory state might be misleading, since each 
regime could share some the features of the 
other regime. In summary, this study con-
tributes to filling the previously identified 
gap in the literature regarding examining the 
political contingency concept in less liberal 
regulatory regimes.
V. conclusion
The intensive case study undertaken at the 
OGBI has illustrated the processes by which 
the state intervenes in public firms’ strategy 
and target formation, as well as the means 
by which these organizations implement 
the Qatarization strategy. The current re-
search has identified the tensions resulting 
from state intervention. Another example 
of the contributions of the current study is 
the identification of the diverse approaches 
toward Qatarization within the participating 
companies. The rich data collected from the 
interviews have helped to highlight the dif-
ferences in management reaction to the pol-
icy and the implication of the policy on the 
HR practices in the participating companies. 
Moreover, the intensive research approach 
made it possible to recognize informal 
means and techniques that are used to avoid 
Qatarization or to act against the rules, for 
example, poaching national employees from 
the OGBI. Based on the contributions of 
the present study, it can be argued that the 
situation in Qatar is not just another case of 
political contingency; rather, it is a unique 
case which has proved to be enlightening, 
especially in expanding current knowledge 
of the role of the state in a certain type of 
regulatory regime such as the developmen-
tal state.
In addition to providing new insights into 
both of these areas, the findings have estab-
lished an agenda for future research. Since 
the present study has focused only on the 
OGBI, further research should examine sim-
ilar processes in other sectors. Investigation 
of other public, private, and mixed sectors 
in Qatar might provide stimulating findings 
especially, when compared to the OGBI. In 
turn, such comparisons and further interpre-
tations might provide a good basis for as-
sessing the similarities and differences in 
aspects of the implementation of the Qata-
rization process. Moreover, future research 
might highlight some of the main challenges 
facing such a process in these sectors and 
industries. Furthermore, since the case study 
of the current research was the country of 
Qatar, an example of a developmental state, 
further research examining a similar process 
in other developmental states, for instance 
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Malaysia and Singapore or other GCC 
countries such as UAE and Saudi Arabia, 
would extend current understanding of how 
the external environment influences HRM 
policies in this type of regulatory regime. 
This would provide a basis for comparisons 
and, hence, further interpretations of the no-
tion of political contingency in less liberal 
regulatory regimes.
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